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ARE LAWS AGAINST
ASSISTED SUICIDE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
by Yale Kamisar

n Feb. 25, 1993, shortly after Dr. Jack Kevorkian helped a 15th person die by
suicide, Michigan enacted a law making assisted suicide a felony punishable by up to
four years in prison. The law, effective that very day, prohibits anyone with knowledge that another
person intends to commit suicide from either "intentionally providing the physical means" or
"intentionally participating in a physical act" by which that other person commits suicide.
With its new anti-assisted suicide law, Nfjchigan joined approximately 35 other states which
criminalize assisted suicide (most by specific legislation, but a few by viewing it as a form of murder
or manslaughter). As soon as the Michigan law went into effect, the American Civil Liberties Union
of Michigan brought a law suit on behalf of two cancer patients and several health care professionals challenging the anti-assisted suicide law's constitutionality. Are all these laws constitutionally
vulnerable?
Jn this article, adapted from one that appeared in the May-June 1993 issue of the Hastings Center
Report, Professor Yale Kamisar considers and rejects various arguments that have been made for a
due process right to assisted suicide. He concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court will not, and should
not, strike down laws such as Michigan's on constitutional grounds.
On May 20, less than a week after Professor Kamisar's article was published, Judge Cynthia
Stephens of the Wayne County Circuit Court struck down Michigan's three-month-old law (Hobbins
v. Attorney General of Michigan).
Judge Stephens invalidated the law on the basis of a rather technical Michigan constitutional
provision relating to the objects and changes of purpose of state laws. But in what some would call
an advisory opinion and others an alternative holding, she made it clear that if she had not been able
to invalidate the law on procedural grounds, she would have issued a preliminary injunction against
its enforcement on the basis of a due process right to assisted suicide. Kamisar strongly criticizes this
aspect of her opinion in "'Right to Die' Can't Be the Last Word," Legal Times, June 14, 1993,
pp. 29-30. On June 22, the Michigan Court of Appeals stayed Judge Stephens' ruling and reinstated
the assisted suicide ban while it reviewed the merits of her decision.
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A "Right" to Suicide?
Is there a "right" to commit suicide? If so, does it include the right to enlist the
assistance of others?
So far as I know, nowadays no state makes either suicide or attempted suicide a
crime. Nor does the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (although the code
does criminalize aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide). Why is neither suicide
itself nor attempted suicide still a crime in this country? And what follows from this?
The fact that suicide and attempted suicide are no longer crimes in this country does
not mean that society approves these acts or that it recognizes that personal autonomy
or "self-determination" extends this far. As the University of Chicago's Leon Kass has
recently observed, the capacity to take one's life - "I have inclination, means, reasons,
opportunity, and you cannot stop me, and it's not against the law"- does not establish
the right to do so.
The comments to the Model Penal Code are helpful on this issue:
There is a certain moral extravagance in imposing criminal punishment on a
person who has sought his own self-destruction ... and who more properly
requires medical or psychiatric attention. There is no form of criminal
punishment that is acceptable for a completed suicide, and criminal punishment
is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts to commit suicide.
The comments to the Model Penal Code go on to say, however, thatthe factthat criminal
sanctions will not deter the suicide itself does
not mean that the criminal law is equally powerless to influence the behavior
of those who would aid or induce another to take his own life. Moreover, in
principle it would seem that the interests in the sanctity of life that are
represented by the'criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses
a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may
be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim.

Does the "Right to Die" Include
the Right to Assisted Suicide?
As a rallying cry, the "right to die" is hard to beat. But it is much easier to chant a
slogan than to apply it to specific situations. There is no absolute or general right to die.
The only right or liberty that the Karen Ann Quinlan case and subsequent so-called right
to die rulings have established is the right under certain circumstances to be disconnected from artificial life support systems or, as many have called it, the right to die a
natural death.
The Michigan anti-assisted suicide law recognizes this right by explicitly excluding
from its coverage "withholding or withdrawing medical treatment." It also exempts
"prescribing, dispensing or administering" medication or treatment designed "to relieve
pain or discomfort and not to cause death, even if the medication or procedure may
hasten or increase the risk of death."
In the 1970s, the Quinlan case brought the right to die issue to national prominence
and set the tone for the developments in law and bioethics that followed. But the
Quinlan court specifically distinguished between committing or assisting in a suicide
and what it called "the ending of artificial life support systems" - the only issue
presented.
As one of the leading commentators in this field, Rutgers University Law School's
Norman Cantor, recently observed: "The assertion that rejection of life-saving medical
treatment by competent patients constitutes suicide has been uniformly rejected usually based on a distinction between letting nature take its course and initiating
external death-causing agents."
The one right to die case that rivals Quinlan for prominence is the 1990 Nancy Beth
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Cruzan decision - the only case on death, dying and the right of privacy ever decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court. As did Quinlan, the Cruzan.case involved the right to end
artificial life support and it, too, provides no comfort to proponents of a constitutional
right to assisted suicide.
The Cruzan Court sustained a state's power to keep alive, over her family's objections, an incompetent patient who had not left clear instructions for ending life-sustaining treatment. In the course ofrejecting the efforts of Nancy's parents to terminate her
artificial feeding, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who spoke for five members of the
court, pointed out that a state has an undeniable interest in the protection and preservation of human life - even the life of a person in a persistent vegetative state. The chief
justice supported this assertion by noting that "the majority of states in this country have
laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide."
If a majority of the Supreme Court meant to suggest that laws against assisted
suicide are constitutionally suspect, it chose a strange way of doing so.
The chief justice assumed for purposes of the case that a competent person does have
"a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving hydration and nutrition." But he
declined to characterize it as a "fundamental right" - a designation that requires a state
to offer a compelling justification for restricting that right (a test the state can rarely
satisfy). Instead, he called the right a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. The
Court, it seems, will allow states to restrict the liberty interest upon a lesser showing of
need than it would require if that interest were characterized as a fundamental right.
Although the Chief Justice tentatively assumed that there is some degree of constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment, concurring
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was more explicit and more emphatic on this point.
"[T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause," she wrote, "must protect, if it
protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reiect medical treatment,
including the artificial delivery of food and water." But she, too, avoided fundamental
right language.
The Cruzan case is hardly the court's last word on death, dying, termination of life
support, assisted suicide and euthanasia. The principles lurking in this area will be
brought into sharper focus only by new prodding of the facts of new cases and by taking
a fresh look, each time, at the overall problem.
If Cruzan demonstrates anything, however, I think it signals the reluctance of the
high court to "constitutionalize" an area marked by divisive social and legal debate and
its inclination to defer instead to the states' judgments in this difficult field . A Supreme
Court that refused to constitutionalize a right to die broad enough to uphold the claims
of the Cruzan family is hardly likely to constitutionalize a right to assisted suicide.
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Justice Scalia's
Concurring Opinion
We should not forget that there was one justice in the Cruzan case who did equate
the termination of life support with ordinary suicide - Antonin Scalia. Although his
lone concurring opinion was more or less ignored by the other justices, it should not go
unnoticed.
Justice Scalia maintained that for constitutional purposes "there is nothing distinctive
about accepting death through the refusal of 'medical treatment,' as opposed to
accepting it through the refusal of [natural] food, or through the failure to shut off the
engine and get out of the car after parking in one's garage after work." As he viewed the
case, the request of Nancy Cruzan's parents to terminate their daughter's artificial
feeding and hydration was, in effect, the assertion of a right to suicide.
But Justice Scalia is well aware that the answer you get depends on the question you
ask. Surely, a principal reason why he framed the question the way he did was his
confidence that there was no way a majority of the Court would recognize a constitutional right to commit suicide. And nothing any of the other eight justices said suggests
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that Scalia's confidence was unfounded.
In fact, the other justices did not say anything about a right to suicide. None of them
disputed Scalia's point "that American law has always accorded the state the power to
prevent, by force if necessary, suicide." Nor did any of them disagree that, as Scalia wrote,
"there is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our
tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'
Although none of Justice Scalia' s colleagues responded in so many words to his
argument that the termination of lifesaving medical treatment constitutes suicide, they
responded nevertheless. They all framed the question in terms of a right to refuse or to be
free from "unwanted medical treatment" or, more specifically, "unwanted artificial
nutrition and hydration."
As a matter of logic, I think there is a good deal to be said for analogizing a patient's
termination of life-sustaining medical treatment to ordinary suicide. But law is not entirely
a syllogism.
It may be helpful to view the Cruzan case as involving two competing traditions. One is
the common law right to refuse medical treatment, even life-saving surgery. As the Cruzan
majority observed, "the logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is the right not
to consent, that is, to reject treatment." The other tradition, which has continued to exist
alongside the first one, is the anti-suicide tradition, as evidenced by society's discouragement of suicide and attempted suicide and by the many criminal laws against assisted
suicide.
In Cruzan, a majority, perhaps as many as eight justices, evidently decided that the
termination of artificial nutrition and hydration was more consistent with the rationale of
the cases upholding the right to refuse treatment. So far as we can tell, only Justice Scalia
believed it implicated the concerns underlying the anti-suicide tradition .

.•

Assisted Suicide vs.
Active Voluntary Euthanasia
Debating the constitutional "right" to assisted suicide requires us to consider the fine,
often blurred line between doctor-assisted suicide and physician-administered voluntary
euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia has been variously described as assisted suicide or on the
knife's edge between suicide and murder, and suicide has sometimes been called selfadrninistered euthanasia.
Doctor-assisted suicide is not quite active voluntary euthanasia for, unlike euthanasia,
the final act that brings on death is performed by the patient herself, not her doctor. But
suppose that a person is unable to swallow the barbiturates that will bring about death or
lacks the physical capacity to trigger a suicide machine? If the right to control the time and
manner of one's death- the right to shape one's death in the most humane and dignified
manner one chooses - is well-founded, how can it be denied to someone simply because
she is unable to perform the final act by herself? Although there is a "mechanical" distinction between assisted suicide and euthanasia, is it a distinction without a difference?
Yes, answered the late Joseph Fletcher, the medical ethicist who advocated active
euthanasia for some fifty years. As he viewed the matter, "it is impossible to separate
[active voluntary euthanasia] from suicide; it is indeed, a form of suicide," and the case for
active voluntary euthanasia "depends upon the case for the righteousness of suicide."
That may be, but others have strongly resisted linking the two. Thus, in his new book
Death and Dignity, Dr. Timothy Quill, the Rochester, N.Y. physician who assisted a longstanding patient to commit suicide, comes out in favor of physician-assisted suicide, but
balks at active voluntary euthanasia. Quill does not support the latter practice, at least at
this time, because of the "potential for abuse" and because "it puts the physician in a very
powerful position," whereas in the case of doctor-assisted suicide "the balance of power
between doctor and patient is more nearly equal."
I find this reasoning more conclusory than explanatory. Dr. Quill would require many
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safeguards for physician-assisted suicide (e.g., the patient must freely, clearly and repeatedly ask to die; her judgment must not be distorted; the physician must make sure that the
patients suffering and request are not the product of inadequate comfort care). If, as he
believes, these safeguards would greatly reduce the risk of abuse and render the balance of
power between doctor and patient relatively equal, why would they not achieve the same
results for voluntary euthanasia? Conversely, if even when all the safeguards Quill
proposes are in place it would still be imprudent to legalize active voluntary euthanasia,
why is it safe to sanction assisted suicide?
Although I am opposed to both assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia, I find
the position taken by Brown University philosopher Dan Brock (who supports both
practices) more coherent and principled than Dr. Quill's. Observes Professor Brock:
In both [assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia], the choice rests fully with the
patient. In both [cases] the patient acts last in the sense of the right to change his
or her mind until the point at which the lethal process becomes irreversible. If there
is no significant, intrinsic moral difference between the two, it is difficult to see
why public or legal policy should permit one but not the other; worries about abuse
or about giving anyone dominion over the lives of others apply equally well to
either.
I find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that Dr. Quill's position is colored by the fact,
as he notes, that "unlike assisted suicide, where the legal implications have yet to be fully
clarified, euthanasia is illegal in all states in the United States and likely to be vigorously
prosecuted." Dr. Quill and I disagree about a number of things. But I venture to say we are
in agreement on one - the uniform ban against active euthanasia is not going to be struck
down on the ground that it violates the right to die. Therefore, a proponent of the right to
assisted suicide, understandably, is likely to put as much distance as possible between that
concept and euthanasia.
"'

Only for the Terminally Ill?
If you are trying to establish a right to assisted suicide, it is good advocacy to frame the
issue narrowly - to speak only of a right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill. But is
there any principled way to so limit the right? If the merciful termination of suffering (or
termination of an unendurable existence) is the basis for this right, why limit it to those
who are terminally ill?
Alan Sullivan, who has presented a persuasive argument for a constitutional right to
suicide, makes plain that he would not limit such a right to the terminally ill. "Surely," he
observes, "under a variety of circumstances life may be unendurable to a reasonable
person, even though he does not face the prospect of immediate and painful death."
It is interesting to note that, although Dr. Quill carefully circumscribes the right to
assisted suicide in many respects, he would not limit it to the terminally ill. "The patient
must have a condition," Quill tells us, "that is incurable, and associated with severe,
unrelenting suffering." (Emphasis added.) Though he anticipates that most people who
desire physician-assisted suicide "will be irnrninently terminal," Quill does "not want to
arbitrarily exclude persons with inrurable, but not imminently terminal, progressive
illnesses such as ALS or multiple sclerosis." (Emphasis added.) But is it any less arbitrary
to exclude the quadriplegic? the victim of a paralytic stroke? the mangled survivor of a
road accident? a person afflicted with severe arthritis?
Why stop there? If a competent person comes to the unhappy conclusion that his
existence is unbearable and freely, clearly and repeatedly requests assisted suicide, why
should he be rebuffed because he does not qualify under somebody else's standards? Isn't
this an arbitrary limitation of self-determination and personal autonomy? In his new book,
The Troubled Dream of Life, Daniel Callahan asks, "How can self-determination have any
limits? Why are not the person's desires or motives, whatever they be, sufficient?"
As I understand the position of those advocating a constitutional right to suicide and to
assisted suicide, a person who qualifies should have the same right to enlist the aid of

33

!though
suicide
occurs at an
alarming rate
among young
people, the highest
suicide rates
and the greatest
number of suicides
are found among
people over the age
offifty.

others to die by suicide as one now has to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical
treatment. If so, it is fairly clear that once established the right to assisted suicide will
not be restricted to the terminally ill. For as demonstrated by such decisions as Elizabeth Bouvia, a case involving a young woman with a case of severe cerebral palsy who
was not terminally ill, and Larry McAfee, a case involving a quadriplegic who apparently had a long life expectancy, the right to terminate life support has not been so
limited.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not rule on these cases, they were warmly
received by most bioethicists and medico-legal commentators. Moreover, in the Cruzan
case the high court failed to attach any significance to the fact that Nancy Cruzan was
not dying or terminally ill, as those terms are usually defined. No doubt many thought
that she "might as well be dead" or that she was "better off dead" but if her feeding tube
had not been removed Nancy might have been kept alive another 20 or 30 years.

The Dangers of Establishing
a "Right" to Assisted Suicide
I believe that any state that prohibits assisted suicide can advance justifications for its
legislation that go well beyond the law's conformity to religious doctrine or "morality."
And I think these justifications are sufficiently strong to withstand constitutional attack.
Philosophers have spent much time and effort addressing such questions as: When, if
ever, is it "rational" for a person to want to commit suicide? Is there a moral right to
commit rational suicide? But I think the more relevant questions for a legislator considering the desirability of a law prohibiting assisted suicide and a judge determining the
constitutionality of such"a law are these:
So far as we can tell, how common or rare is the so-called rational suicide? How often
does suicide occur in the absence of a psychiatric disorder? How often do primary care
physicians fail to recognize treatable depression in their patients, especially elderly
patients? How often is the failure of a primary care physician to take an aggressive
approach to pain management or a failure to recognize or adequately to treat depressive
illness influenced by ageism - prejudice against and stereotypes about elderly people?
How likely is it that the social sanctioning of rational suicide and assisted suicide will lead
to an increase in "irrational" suicide and assisted suicide? In a suicide-permissive society,
how often will the right to commit suicide and the right to enlist the assistance of others in
this enterprise be interpreted, especially by the most vulnerable, as the duty to do so? In a
suicide-permissive society, how often will a burdensome, elderly relative not otherwise
desirous of death be "helped along," or pressured or manipulated into suicide?
A court assessing the constitutionality of a criminal prohibition against assisted suicide
must do a good deal more than simply reason by analogy from the relevant precedents on
the books. And such a court must keep in mind that it is doing something quite different
than simply judging a debate among philosophers. As Philip Devine observed in The
Ethics of Homicide:

"If philosophers have something to say to the law, so also has the law something
to say to philosophers. Attention to the working, or the possible working, of any
institution or principle may well give us insight into weaknesses which remain
concealed so long as it is posed in sufficiently abstract terms."
Suicide is a problem of considerable magnitude. Although it once ranked 22nd on the
list of causes of death in the United States, it now ranks (depending on the particular year)
eighth or ninth. Every year there are between 25,000 and 30,000 reported cases of suicide.
The number of cases is probably grossly underreported both because of the social stigma
involved and because of the possible loss of life insurance benefits. Moreover, it is
estimated that every year in this country several hundred thousand people attempt suicide
and that about 10 percent of that group go on to kill themselves within a 10-year period.
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Although suicide occurs at an alanning rate among young people, the highest suicide
rates and the greatest number of suicides are found among people over the age of fifty.
Indeed, for American white males, from childhood on, the risk of suicide rises with age
until the eighth decade of life. Suicides by people over the age of sixty account for about 25
percent of all suicides.
No doubt the higher rate of suicide among the elderly has led advocates of the right to
rational suicide and to assisted suicide to focus on this age group, especially on elderly
people who are terminally ill. But the problem of suicide is a good deal more complicated.
Consider the views of Herbert Hendin, a professor of psychiatry and a leading
suicidologist, who is opposed to the legalization of doctor-assisted suicide. He concedes
that it is sometimes rational for a person with a painful terminal illness to wish to end his
life. Indeed, he observes in his illuminating book, Suicide in America, "that is precisely why
supporters of the 'right to suicide' or 'death control' position" base their arguments on the
cases of patients suffering from incurable, painful cancer. But Dr. Hendin is quick to add:
In reality ... such understandable cases form only a small percentage of all suicides
or potential suicides. The majority of suicides confront us with the problem of
understanding people whose situation does not seem, from an outsider's viewpoint, hopeless or often even critical. The knowledge that there are more suicides
by people who wrongly believe themselves to be suffering from cancer than there
are suicides by those who actually have cancer puts the problem in some
perspective.
According to suicidologist David Clark, the major studies all agree in showing that the
fraction of suicide victims struggling with terminal illness at the time of their death is in the
range of 2 percent to 4 percent. Two-thirds of those who died by suicide when they were in
their late 60s, 70s, and 80s were in relatively good physical health.
To ask another relevant question: How often does suicide occur fn the absence of a
major psychiatric illness? It would not be surprising if the answer to this question were
affected by what one thought about the right to commit suicide. Some believe that virtually
every person who wishes to die by suicide is mentally ill. Others maintain that such a
person is simply called mentally ill so that his behavior may be controlled.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the studies that do seem to bear on this question. And
when one dips into the relevant literature one discovers considerable authority for the view
that a suicide rarely occurs in the absence of a major psychiatric disorder.
Yeates Conwell and Eric Caine, geriatric psychiatrists at the University of Rochester
Medical School, warn that notably lacking from the debate about rational suicide and
physician-assisted suicide is "attention to the effects of psychiatric illness on rational
decision making." They point to suicide study findings that 90 percent to 100 percent of
persons who die by suicide do so while they have a diagnosable psychiatric illness, an
observation that is equally true in suicides among the elderly. According to many experts,
even in terminally ill patients who express a wish to die, often the wish is a symptom of
treatable depression.
More significant for our purposes, I think, than the prevalence of depressive illness
among people who die by suicide is the inability of depressed persons to recognize the
severity of their own symptoms and the failure of primary physician to detect major
depression, especially in elderly patients. As Conwell and Caine emphasize:
[M]any doctors on the front lines, who would be responsible for implementing any
policy that allowed assisted suicide, are ill equipped to assess the presence and
effect of depressive illness in older patients. In the absence of that sophisticated
understanding, the determination of a suicidal patient's "rationality" can be no
more than speculation, subject to the influence of personal biases about aging, old
age, and the psychological effects of chronic disease.
Ageism - the prejudices and stereotypes applied to the elderly solely on the basis of
their age - may manifest itself in a failure to recognize treatable depression, a refusal to
take an aggressive approach to pain management, the view that an elderly person's desire to
commit suicide is more rational than a younger patient's would be, or, more generally, the
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attitude that the elder has every reason to be depressed or that "if I were in his place I
would want to die too." Unfortunately, and unnecessarily, such views can prove to be a
self-fulfilling prophecy.

Manipulated Suicide
The legalization of assisted suicide or the recognition of a liberty interest in or a right
to assisted suicide poses other dangers. Hendin says evidence relating to the contagious
or suggestive effects of suicide on the emotionally vulnerable is accumulating; these
effects are "likely to be magnified if suicide is given social sanction."
The impact on the elderly and the infirm poses special problems. In The Enigma of
Suicide, George Colt writes, "Although we shrink from the idea of elderly suicide and
euthanasia, we encourage it by our neglect and indifference." He cites sociologist
Menno Boldt' s observation:
Suicidal persons are succumbing to what they experience as an overpowering
and unrelenting coercion in their environment to cease living. This sense of
coercion takes many familiar forms: fear, isolation, abuse, uselessness, and so on.
Will these pressures intensify in a society that sanctions assisted suicide (and thereby
suicide as well)? In a suicide-permissive society, will family members so inclined be
more likely to alter or manipulate a sick, elderly person's circumstances (for example,
by providing shoddy or even hostile care) so that suicide becomes a reasonable, even
attractive choice?
In a climate in which suicide is the rational thing to do, or at least a reasonable
option, will it become the unreasonable thing not to do? The noble thing to do? In a
suicide-permissive society plagued by shortages of various kinds and a growing
population of "nonproductive" people, how likely is it that an old or ill person will be
encouraged to spare both herself and her family the agony of a slow decline, even
though she would not have considered suicide on her own?
The best discussion of "manipulated suicide" appears in a well-known essay by
philosopher Margaret Battin who, ironically, is a proponent of rational suicide. With
open-minded, balanced scholarship, Battin presents a strong case against her own
position. She conscientiously spells out how acceptance of her views would open the
way for both individual and societal manipulation of vulnerable people into choosing
death by suicide when they would not otherwise have done so. She concludes, nevertheless, that "on moral grounds we must accept, not reject, the notion of rational suicide."
A state legislature is free to agree with Professor Battin, but must it? Is it constitutionally required to do so? I hardly think so.
Albert Alschuler, my counterpart at the University of Chicago Law School, recently
referred to "the historic divide" between direct killing (and, I would add, assisting in
another's suicide) and the termination of life support or "letting die." Since I have been
focusing on the constitutional dimensions of the right to shape the timing and manner of
one's death I do not have to argue that a state would be unwise to cross this historic
divide (although I would if I had to do so). I need only argue that a state is not constitutionally compelled to cross this line. It is free, rather, to give Professor Battin's observations and insights about the dangers of manipulated suicide more weight than she
herself is willing to do.
Although Battin is painfully aware of "the moral quicksand" into which the notion
of rational suicide threatens to lead us, she voices the hope that if we accept that
concept, "perhaps then we may discover a path around" the quicksand. Perhaps. Perhaps
not. In any event, I submit, the Constitution does not prevent a legislature from reaching
the conclusion that there is no safe path around.
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